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Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ingraham

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division

March 14, 2017

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID INGRAHAM, MICHAEL INGRAHAM, and SUSAN INGRAHAM, Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          Bruce Howe Hendricks United States District Judge

         This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company's (“Plaintiff” or “Allstate”) motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24), Defendants David Ingraham, Michael Ingraham, and Susan Ingraham's (collectively “Defendants”) motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 25), and Defendants' motion to compel (ECF No. 28). For the reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is granted, and Defendants' motion to compel denied, without prejudice and with leave to refile.

         BACKGROUND

         This is an insurance coverage action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 to determine whether Allstate has a duty to defend or indemnify Defendants for all claims related to and arising out of the actions alleged in the underlying lawsuit styled Anthony Marcantonio v. Kyle Dudzinkski, Luke Papendick, Charles Rommel, David Ingraham, and Jacob Pearce, Case No. 3:15-cv-00029-NKM, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia (“Underlying Lawsuit”). The Underlying Lawsuit is now closed, the parties thereto having reached a confidential settlement agreement on March 28, 2016. See Marcantonio v. Dudzinkski, et al., C/A No. 3:15-cv-00029-NKM (W.D. Va. May 13, 2016). Allstate seeks a declaration from the Court that an insurance policy issued by Allstate to Defendants Michael Ingraham and Susan Ingraham (the “Policy”) provides no coverage for claims asserted against them in the Underlying Lawsuit, and that the Policy provides no coverage for Defendant David Ingraham (hereinafter “Ingraham”) in connection with the Underlying Lawsuit.

         In the Underlying Lawsuit, Anthony Marcantonio (“Marcantonio”), a freshman swimmer recruited by the University of Virginia Swim Team due to his athletic promise, sought damages against five upperclassmen swimmers (collectively “Underlying Defendants”), including Ingraham, for their respective roles in an alleged hazing incident during the Swim Team's “Welcome Week.” (See Underlying Complaint, ECF No. 7-1.) All of the allegations in the Underlying Lawsuit related to the alleged hazing of Marcantonio by Ingraham and other upperclassmen members of the men's Swim Team. (Id.) In his complaint, Marcantonio brought nine causes of action related to the alleged hazing and one specific remedy request, namely: (1) Assault; (2) Battery; (3) False Imprisonment; (4) Hazing in Violation of Virginia Civil Law; (5) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) Punitive Damages; (8) Conspiracy in Violation of Virginia Common Law; (9) Conspiracy in Violation of Virginia Code Sections 18.2-499 and 18.2-500; and (10) Negligence. (Id. at 23-28.) Defendant David Ingraham is the son of Defendants Michael Ingraham and Susan Ingraham, the named insureds on the Policy at issue in the case sub judice.

         The Underlying Complaint alleged a wide range of conduct by upperclassmen swimmers, including Ingraham, against Marcantonio and other “first year”[1] swimmers, and asserted that the conduct amounted to hazing, various intentional torts, and negligence. (See generally id.) The actions complained of are largely contained in paragraph 26 of the Underlying Complaint, describing a series of events at a near-campus residence generally referred to as the “Swim House, ” and including but not limited to: (1) blaring “heavy-metal, satanic” music on a “television-sized speaker” so loudly that Marcantonio could hardly hear, with no conventional lighting on, and a strobe light as the only light source; (2) screaming and yelling obscenities and other vulgar speech at the first years throughout the events of the evening, sometimes with a threatening or aggressive tone; (3) instructing the first years to say derogatory and offensive words; (4) placing buckets on the first years' heads; (5) insulting and taunting the first years; (6) physically placing the first years in a line while the Underlying Defendants continued to taunt them; (7) “waltzing” in front of the first years and making threatening movements and grunts toward them; (8) blindfolding the first years with dirty, stained ties and cummerbunds; (9) forcing the first years to walk in a humiliating position while performing the “Elephant Walk, ” which involved them reaching between their legs, grabbing the private parts of the person behind them, and moving as a group; (10) forcing the first years to drink large quantities of liquids, including alcohol, while being closed in a dark, heated bathroom for an hour, with the threat of being sodomized if they did not comply, ultimately resulting in Marcantonio vomiting when he was forced to drink a large quantity of milk and prune juice; (11) injuring the eye of one first year when defendant Charles Rommel flew into a rage and smashed a glass bottle on the ground, causing a glass splinter to enter the first year's eyeball; (12) instructing the first years to imitate and mock one female Swim Team member who experiences episodes of hiccupping in a unique manner causing a distinctive sound; (13) instructing the first years to answer an intrusive and vulgar questionnaire, and directing each first year in turn to answer humiliating and degrading follow-up questions; (14) bringing each first year out of the bathroom where they were contained, one at a time, to be further humiliated in front of the group of upperclassmen; (15) pouring an unknown liquid on Marcantonio's head while he was being thus humiliated, forced to sit in a chair, and questioned in front of the group, blindfolded; (16) forcing the first years to maintain a “streamline” swim position with their “arms over their heads, shoulders squeezed toward the ears, and hands clasped together;” (17) forcing the first years to name and then eat a live goldfish provided to each of them by the upperclassmen; (18) instructing the first years to complete a scavenger list by a date certain, which would require stealing items from retail stores, the school, or other members of the Swim Team in violation of the University of Virginia's Honor Code; and (19) requiring the first years to wear “filthy ties and cummerbunds” around campus for the remainder of Welcome Week. (Id. ¶ 26.)

         In summarizing these alleged actions, the Underlying Complaint stated, “[Marcantonio] and the other first years on the swim team had been thus tormented, harassed, assaulted, held captive, threatened and terrorized for over five hours. During the entire time [Marcantonio] had been subjected to the hazing described above, he had felt captive and not free to leave [the Swim House].” (Id. ¶ 27.) Furthermore, Marcantonio alleged that Ingraham and the other Underlying Defendants, in retaliation for Marcantonio honestly answering questions about the alleged hazing incident to the head swim coach and the University of Virginia Dean of Students, ostracized and threatened him to the point where the swim coach instructed him not to practice in the pool when the other swimmers were present out of concern for his physical safety. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Ultimately, Marcantonio could no longer swim for the University of Virginia effectively and left the school. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40.)

         The “threat of sodomy” referenced above, stemmed from statements made in a vulgar email sent to the first year swimmers from the pseudonym “Mr. Mean, ” allegedly drafted in concert by the Underlying Defendants. The email instructed the first years where and when to show up for the first event of Welcome Week, which turned out to be the alleged hazing incident at the Swim House. (Id. ¶ 24.) The threat would supposedly be realized if any of the first years disclosed the details about the time and location of the first event, and the first years were instructed to “keep [their] FUCKING MOUTHS SHUT.” (Id.) This threat of sodomy was allegedly repeated verbally while the first-year swimmers were contained in the bathroom and being yelled at to drink all the alcohol and other liquids provided. (Id. ¶ 26(xviii).) At that point, the threat would supposedly be realized for each of the first years “if any drop of alcohol was poured out the window or down the drain, ” which had been duct-taped closed along with the toilet, and the shower clogged.[2] (Id.)

         As part of the settlement of the Underlying Lawsuit, the parties agreed to the issuance of a public statement in which it was acknowledged that Marcantonio had withdrawn certain allegations from the Underlying Complaint, namely: (1) that he was forced to drink alcohol; (2) that he was subjected to sexual assault or sexual battery (regarding the so-called “Elephant Walk”); (3) that the door on the bathroom where he and other first years were contained during a portion of the alleged hazing incident was locked (though it was simultaneously acknowledged that, under the circumstances, Marcantonio did not believe he was free to leave); (4) that Charles Rommel asked Marcantonio a question which prompted him to respond with a racial epithet; and (5) that any items were stolen during the scavenger hunt that was part of the alleged hazing incident. (ECF No. 36-2.) Marcantonio stood by the remaining allegations in the Underlying Complaint; the Underlying Defendants correspondingly denied those allegations. (Id.)

         In their joint statement, the Underlying Defendants asserted their own position regarding the alleged conduct in question and the surrounding circumstances, including: (1) that before Welcome Week began, the team captains (Dudzinski and Papendick) told the first year swimmers about it and assured them that the upcoming activities were voluntary in terms of whether they drank alcohol or ate the goldfish; (2) that the captains invited the first years to come to them if they had any concerns (a contention that Marcantonio denied); (3) that none of the first years were asked to grab the genitals of any member of the team, and none of them did; (4) that University of Virginia investigators interviewed numerous people, including Marcantonio and four of the Underlying Defendants (Dudzinski, Papendick, Rommel, and Ingraham), and the investigators' final report stated that the Underlying Defendants interviewed had been “honest and cooperative”; and (5) subsequent to its own investigation, and prior to Marcantonio filing the Underlying Complaint, the University of Virginia Judiciary Committee (“UJC”) conducted a hearing on the issue of whether Dudzinski had violated the University's Standards of Conduct against hazing (Standard 6) and against intentionally or recklessly threatening the health or safety of another (Standard 2), [3] and based on that March 23, 2015 hearing the UJC found that Dudzinski was not guilty of either alleged violation. (ECF No. 36-2 at 3.)

         Prior to the settlement of the Underlying Lawsuit, Ingraham defended the action and opposed any characterization of the events during Welcome Week as “hazing” or as stemming from intent to harm Marcantonio or anyone else. In his answer to the Underlying Complaint (“Underlying Answer”), Ingraham asserted a very different picture of the facts related to the alleged hazing incident. The Underlying Answer stated, inter alia: (1) the Welcome Week events were a tradition of the men's Swim Team that had been mimicked in the three years prior to Marcantonio's matriculation at University of Virginia, and its components did not materially change over the course of those years; (2) the purpose of Welcome Week was to enhance the competitiveness of the team and build team unity and spirit; (3) Marcantonio and the other first year swimmers were informed in advance that no one would be required to consume alcohol, and when Marcantonio indicated he did not drink alcohol he was told that his preference would be respected; (4) Marcantonio was specifically told that he could choose not to participate in any or all of the Welcome Week events, and he elected to participate; (5) Ingraham did not draft the “Mr. Mean” emails (including the email containing the threat of sodomy with a “dry-ice dildo”); (6) although derogatory, the Mr. Mean emails were intended to convey frivolity and jocularity and to be so cartoonish as not to be taken literally; (7) the Elephant Walk involved grabbing the wrist of the person behind you, not genitalia as originally alleged by Marcantonio and later withdrawn; (8) Marcantonio voluntarily consumed milk and prune juice, not alcohol; (9) the vulgar questionnaires the first years were instructed to complete were designed to be “over the top” and were intended to invite fictional responses; (10) the bathroom was not locked, and anyone could leave at any time; (11) the upperclassmen and first years were laughing with one another throughout the individual questioning, which employed the same exaggerated tone as the emails; (12) the individual questioning of Marcantonio also included laughter and joking; (13) everyone present, including Marcantonio, capped the opening night event with toasting; (14) Marcantonio's toast included an expression of his pride in being a part of the team and his excitement over the upcoming season; (15) Marcantonio volunteered to be responsible for holding and maintaining the single list of items to be gathered during the scavenger hunt; (16) Marcantonio voluntarily swallowed a minnow, and the one first year who objected for religious reasons was not required to do so, and was not subject to criticism or consequence for that decision; (17) after the events of the alleged hazing incident, Marcantonio joined the other first years and upperclassmen at a pizza restaurant; (18) Marcantonio participated in the scavenger hunt over the next week, which did not involve stealing (an allegation that Marcantonio specifically withdrew as part of the settlement agreement); (19) Marcantonio voluntarily participated in all activities, at all times manifested assent, never objected, complained, withdrew, or expressed any reluctance, and was not coerced or threatened; (20) while the events of the evening at the Swim House included a lot of yelling, screaming, and obscenities, the tone of those events was one of jest, joking, and frivolity, not taunting; (21) Ingraham denied that he came menacingly close to Marcantonio with sudden or threatening movements; (22) Ingraham denied that Marcantonio ever appeared to be delirious, fearful, or paralyzed (as alleged in the Underlying Complaint) or that Marcantonio was pushed into his seat during individual questioning in front of the group; (23) Ingraham denied that Marcantonio, or any first year, was subjected to hazing or “forced” to do any particular act on the evening in question; (24) Ingraham denied that he threatened Marcantonio or instructed him to make false statements if asked about the eye injury to one of the first years during the alleged hazing incident; (25) Ingraham denied that the scavenger hunt would require violation of the University Honor Code or any laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, including stealing. (See ECF No. 36-1.)

         On December 17, 2015, following a hearing on the Underlying Defendants' motions to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Marcantonio's causes of action for tortious interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and statutory conspiracy for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 25-1 at 19-23, 25-29.) Additionally, the trial court identified three areas of concern with respect to Marcantonio's overall pleading scheme, which “whether strategically or out of necessity-contains many vague or ambiguous allegations”: (1) the Underlying Complaint often lumps together all “[d]efendants” without regard for which defendant actually did what; (2) the Underlying Complaint uses passive voice and omits the identity of the actor (e.g. “the first years were forced to remain in the darkened bathroom”; Marcantonio “was again forced to sit in a chair”; “all the first years were . . . made to assume a . . . ‘streamline' position”; etc.); (3) some allegations assert that “upperclassmen” took certain actions (e.g. telling Marcantonio to sit down and ordering him to memorize vulgar trivia answers), an ambiguous term that could encompass the Underlying Defendants, non-defendant upperclassmen present at the event, or a mix of the two groups. (Id. at 11-12.) Despite these apparent pleading deficiencies, the trial court found that, with the exception of Defendant Papendick, the Underlying Complaint supplemented its generic or ambiguous references with several specific allegations against the Underlying Defendants by name. (Id. at 12.) With respect to the negligence cause of action, the trial court stated simply, “[T]he Complaint contains ample facts to state a negligence claim.” (Id. at 29.)

         Allstate issued Deluxe Homeowners Insurance Policy No. 0 55 209571 09/15 to Defendants Michael and Susan Ingraham for the September 15, 2013 to September 15, 2014 policy period. (ECF No. 7-2 at 4.) The Policy provides the following definitions for terms used throughout the Policy:

Definitions Used In This Policy
1. “You” or “your”-means the person named on the Policy Declarations as the insured and that person's resident spouse.
2. “Insured person(s)”-means you and, if a resident of your household:
a) any relative; and b) any dependent person in your care.
9. “Occurrence”-means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage.

(ECF No. 7-2 at 22-23 (emphasis in original).)

         The Policy contains “Coverage X Family Liability Protection.” (Id. at 39-41.) The Coverage X provision states, inter alia:

Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. We are not obligated to pay any claim or judgment after we have exhausted our limit of liability.

(Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).) The Coverage X provision also contains certain exclusions, including:

1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person. This exclusion applies even if:
a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct; b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected; or c) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a different person than intended or reasonably expected.
This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.

(Id. (emphasis in original).)

         LEGAL STANDARD

         Summary Judgment

         The Court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

         Accordingly, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the Court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

         Where, as here, the Court is presented with the question of whether an insurance policy covers a particular claim, summary judgment is the proper mechanism by which to determine whether coverage is available. See OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Metro Ready-Mix, Inc., 242 Fed. App'x 936, 939 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Because the facts are undisputed and we are ...


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