Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Marzett v. Charleston County School District

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

February 14, 2017

Patricia Mitchell Marzett, Plaintiff,
v.
Charleston County School District and James Winbush, Melvin Middleton individually and in their official capacity Defendants.

          ORDER AND OPINION

          RICHARD MARK GERGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R. & R.") of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 62) recommending that the Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 49.) This Court adopts the R. & R. as the order of the court and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

         I. Background

         Patricia Mitchell Marzett ("Plaintiff) filed this pro se action in forma pauperis against the Charleston County School District ("CCSD"), James Winbush, and Melvin Middleton in October 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint contains allegations of race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 ("ADEA"); and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-83 ("ADA").

         In a previous order, this Court dismissed Defendant Middleton from the action, dismissed all claims against Winbush in his individual capacity, and dismissed all claims that had accrued during the 2010-2011 school year. (Dkt. No 31.) In June 2016, Defendants CCSD and Winbush filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, including Plaintiffs claims of 1) race, age, disability, and gender discrimination in connection with the non-renewal of her teaching contract for the 2012-2013 school year (asserted against CCSD under Title VII and against Winbush in his official capacity under § 1983), and 2) Plaintiffs claim of retaliation against CCSD. (Dkt. No. 49.)

         II. Facts

         This Court adopts the facts as outlined at length in the R. & R. (Dkt. No. 62 at 3-12) so summarizes only the relevant ones below in the Discussion.

         III. Legal Standard

         a. Summary Judgment

         Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Conversely, the non-moving party must demonstrate that there are disputes of material fact that preclude the award of summary judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

         b. Pro Se Pleadings

         This Court liberally construes pro se pleadings, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the plaintiffs legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

         IV. Race, Age, Disability, and Gender Discrimination Claims

         Plaintiff may prove discrimination under each relevant statute underlying the remaining discrimination claims (Title VII and § 1983, the ADEA, and the ADA) through direct evidence or indirectly through the burden-shifting framework set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (ADEA); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); McDonnell ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.