United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
RONALD I. PAUL, Plaintiff,
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONS; PAUL D. DE HOLCZER, individually and as a partner of the law firm of Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; MICHAEL H. QUINN, individually and as a senior lawyer of Quinn Law Firm, LLC, ; J. CHARLES ORMOND, JR., individually and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER, in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way South Carolina Department of Transportation; MACIE M. GRESHAM, in her individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager South Carolina Department of Transportation; NATALIE J. MOORE, in her individual capacity as Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina Department of Transportation, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE Senior United States District Judge
matter is before the court on Plaintiff Ronald Paul's
amended motion for reconsideration of the judgment pursuant
to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF
Nos. 18 (original motion), 21 (amended motion). The
challenged judgment, entered November 8, 2016, was based on
the Opinion and Order adopting the Report and Recommendation
of the Magistrate Judge dismissing the action without
prejudice. ECF Nos. 15 (Opinion and Order), 16 (Judgment).
The Order also imposed a pre-filing injunction in this
District on new actions relating to the subject matter of the
condemnation of the property located at 2115 Two Notch Road,
Columbia, South Carolina, formerly leased by Paul. Plaintiff
has also filed two motions for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 20,
25) and a motion for a “copy of the settlement
agreement between SCDOT and the Buckles in case 4800,
referenced and referred to by the District Judge.” ECF
reasons set forth below, the court denies Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration, motions for judicial notice, and
motion for settlement agreement.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the court to
alter or amend an earlier judgment: “(1) to accommodate
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for
new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d
284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998)). “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used, however,
to raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the
issuance of judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case
under a novel theory that the party had the ability to
address in the first instance.” Pac. Ins. Co.,
148 F.3d at 403. Relief under Rule 59(e) is “an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”
Id. (internal marks omitted). “Mere
disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.”
Becker, 305 F.3d at 290 (quoting Hutchinson v.
Stanton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Motion for Reconsideration
has filed an initial motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 18)
and an amended motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 21). Both
argue that ground three applies to his motion for
reconsideration: to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice. In support, Plaintiff offers arguments
that merely rehash the contentions in his previous cases and
in his objections to the Report (ECF No. 12) in this case.
Civil Conspiracy Claim
again argues that the Magistrate Judge and District Court
failed to “fully explain and clearly address and
clearly rule on the elements of a civil conspiracy as set
forth in Paul's Complaint (ECF 1), proffered evidence
(Paul I-V) and written objections (ECF 12 at.5-12 in argument
one (arguments 1-5)) to prevent and correct a clear error of
law, and abuse of discretion.” ECF No. 21 at 8
(emphasis in original). However, contrary to Plaintiff's
argument, and as set forth in the Order dismissing this case,
this court found that the Magistrate Judge “did set out
the elements of a civil conspiracy, and found that Paul's
conclusory factual allegations did not plausibly set forth a
claim for conspiracy.” ECF No. 15 at 4. The court has
ruled upon this cause of action and will not revisit it at
this stage, as Plaintiff has provided no grounds to do so.
argues that this court failed to address his written
objections regarding the declaratory judgment claim and
ignored his proffered evidence. This is nearly the identical
argument Plaintiff advanced in his objections, which was
ruled upon in the court's Order of dismissal. As this
argument has been advanced by Plaintiff and ruled upon by
this court, and Plaintiff provides no new reason for
reevaluation, it will not be reconsidered at this stage.
Substantive and Procedural Due Process
relies on Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) in support of his substantive and procedural due
process claims, arguing the “prior Orders and