United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Willie Junior Hines, # 240466, a/k/a Willie Hines, Jr., Petitioner,
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas relief. The
petitioner files this action in forma pauperis under
28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to
review such petitions for relief and submit findings and
recommendations to the District Court. This case should be
petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Tyger River
Correctional Institution in the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (doc. 1-4 at 2). He seeks to vacate his 1997
state convictions of murder, armed robbery, and first-degree
burglary entered in the Spartanburg County Court of General
Sessions (id.) His cited grounds for relief are an
assortment of purported substantive and procedural violations
which he alleges invalidates his conviction and sentence
(doc. 1-4). He contends that he exhausted several of these
grounds for relief in his state PCR action, which the Court
of Common Pleas denied on March 7, 2016 (id.). The
petitioner also states that he has filed a 60(b) motion and a
motion for a writ of mandamus related to his grounds
(see, e.g., doc. 1-4 at 10). The petitioner has
attached an excerpt from the PCR court's order, stamped
January 26, 2016, an order from the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, dated April 26, 2016, prohibiting him from filing
“any further collateral actions in the circuit court,
including PCR action and habeas corpus actions, as well as
any motions relating to the previously filed collateral
actions, challenging petitioner's 1997 convictions,
” and the remittitur to the lower court, dated May 12,
2016 (doc. 1-5 at 8-9, 26-27). The petitioner requests
“time served and vacate and any other relief that is
proper and just” (doc. 1-4 at 16).
court takes judicial notice that in 2003, the petitioner
filed a habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
this Court seeking to overturn the same state convictions.
See Order, Hines v. McLeod, C/A No.
6:03-cv-00158-GRA (D.S.C. June 25, 2003), ECF No. 23,
appeal dismissed (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 2004), ECF No.
This case was decided on the merits. Id.
this court takes judicial notice that in 2006, the petitioner
filed a habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
seeking to overturn the same state convictions. See
Order, Hines v. Bazzle, C/A No. 6:06-cv-01530-GRA
(D.S.C. June 23, 2006), ECF No. 9. This Court dismissed that
action because it was an unauthorized successive § 2254
established local procedure in this judicial district, a
careful review has been made of the pro se petition
filed in the above-captioned case. The review was conducted
pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md.
House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v.
Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). This Court is
charged with screening the petitioner's lawsuit to
determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012). As a
pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are
accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per
curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard,
the petition in this case is subject to summary dismissal.
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that
the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to
allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal
district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”) amended 28
U.S.C. § 2254 and other habeas statutes:
The AEDPA effected a number of substantial changes regarding
the availability of federal postconviction relief to
individuals convicted of crimes in federal and state courts.
Of particular importance here are the provisions of the AEDPA
codifying and extending judicially constructed limits on the
consideration of second and successive applications for
collateral relief. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651 . . . (1996). Under the AEDPA, an individual may not file
a second or successive § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus or § 2255 motion to vacate sentence
without first receiving permission to do so from the
appropriate circuit court of appeals.
In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)
(footnote omitted). The “gatekeeping” mechanism
created by the AEDPA amended § 2244(b) to provide:
The prospective applicant must file in the court of appeals a
motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas
application in the district court. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A
three-judge panel has 30 days to determine whether “the
application makes a prima facie showing that the application
satisfies the requirements ...