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Ashmore v. Williams

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Anderson/Greenwood Division

August 25, 2016

Beattie B. Ashmore, In His Capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for Ronnie Gene Wilson and Atlantic Bullion and Coin, Inc., Plaintiff,
v.
Claude Williams, Jr. individually and d/b/a Realty Associates and d/b/a Williams Grandchildren's Partnership; Realty Associates, and Williams Grandchildren's Partnership, Defendants.

          ORDER AND OPINION

         Plaintiff Beattie B. Ashmore (“Plaintiff”), in his capacity as court-appointed Receiver for Ronnie Gene Wilson (“Wilson”) and Atlantic Bullion and Coin, Inc. (“AB&C”), filed the instant action against Defendants Claude Williams, Jr. (“Williams”[1]) individually and d/b/a Realty Associates and d/b/a Williams Grandchildren's Partnership; Realty Associates (“RA”), and Williams Grandchildren's Partnership (“WGP”) (collectively “Defendants”) to recover grossly excessive payments received by Defendants as a return on their investment in the Wilson-AB&C Ponzi scheme.[2] (ECF No. 1.)

         This matter is before the court as a result of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff opposes Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

         I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO PENDING MOTION

         Plaintiff is the court appointed Receiver in In Re: Receiver for Ronnie Gene Wilson and Atlantic Bullion & Coin, Inc., C/A No. 8:12-cv-02078-JMC, ECF No. 1 (D.S.C. July 25, 2012), a case related to the instant matter. Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n September 7, 2007, Williams, individually, or on behalf of RA and/or WGP made an initial ‘investment' [in the Wilson-AB&C Ponzi scheme] of $52, 250.00.” (ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶ 26.) “Subsequently, Williams, individually, or on behalf of RA and/or WGP made additional ‘investments' totaling $715, 110.00 between May 2008 and February 2009, for a total investment of $767, 360.00.” (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Williams, individually, or on behalf of RA and/or WGP received $1, 056, 952.00 in returns [from the Wilson-AB&C Ponzi scheme] between December 2008 and June 2009, resulting in a profit of $289, 592.00.” (Id. at ¶ 28.)

         Based on his appointment as Receiver tasked with “locating, managing, recouping, and distributing the assets of the Wilson-AB&C investment scheme, ” Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendants on September 10, 2015, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer (in violation of the Statute of Elizabeth, SC Code Ann. § 27-23-10 (2014) and/or the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 18-2-70-18-2-80) and unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 1 & 6 ¶ 39-7 ¶ 53.) On November 30, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Thereafter, on December 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16), to which Defendants filed a Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) on January 4, 2016.

         II. JURISDICTION

         The court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to Plaintiff's allegation that the Complaint “is so related to the In Re Receiver, 8:12-CV-2078-JMC case and the underlying criminal case, United States v. Wilson, et al, 8:12-cr-00320[, ]” cases in which the court has jurisdiction, “that it forms part of the underlying case or controversy.” (ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 3.) The court may properly hear Plaintiff's state law claims for fraudulent transfer and unjust enrichment based on supplemental jurisdiction since these claims “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         A. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

         When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists “by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 1997). “[W]hen, as here, a district court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing or without deferring ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but rather relies on the complaint and affidavits alone, ‘the burden on the plaintiff is simply to make a prima facie showing of sufficient jurisdictional basis in order to survive the jurisdictional challenge.'” Id.; see also New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction when the court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing). In deciding whether plaintiff has met this burden, the court construes all disputed facts and draws all reasonable inferences from the proof in favor of jurisdiction. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits and other evidentiary materials, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., 784 F.Supp. 306, 310 (D.S.C. 1992).

         B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

         A Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). To be legally sufficient a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

         A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999); Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

         IV. ANALYSIS

         A. Dismissal for Lack of ...


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