United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
Claire M. Mensack, Plaintiff,
South Carolina Department of Mental Health and John H. Magill, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL)
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE, Senior United States District Judge.
this action, Plaintiff Claire M. Mensack
(“Mensack”) seeks recovery from her former
employer, Defendant South Carolina Department of Mental
Health (“the Department”) and the
Department’s Director, John H. Magill, for events
surrounding and including the termination of her employment
on November 19, 2014. Mensack asserts six causes of action,
most of which depend on multiple legal theories, some arising
under federal and some arising under state law.
matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for
partial dismissal. ECF No. 6. Specifically, Defendants seek
to dismiss Mensack’s claims to the extent they rely on
(1) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
(2) South Carolina Human Affairs Law (“SCHAL”),
SC Code §§ 1-13-80, 1-13-85, (3) the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq., (4) state common law theory of wrongful
termination in violation of public policy (“Public
Policy Discharge”), and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”). Id. If granted in
full, the motion would result in dismissal of the only claim
against Magill (Fourth cause of action for violation of
Section 1983) and three causes of action asserted against the
Department (Third, Fifth and Sixth causes of action asserted
under the ADA, SCHAL, FLSA and common law of South Carolina).
It would also limit the two remaining claims (for disparate
treatment and retaliation) to reliance on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq.
reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in full and
the challenged claims are dismissed or limited as noted
above. As this resolves the only claim against Magill, he is
dismissed from this action. The matter is referred to the
Magistrate Judge for further proceedings on the remaining
claims against the Department.
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule
73.02 (B)(2), D.S.C., this matter was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West for pre-trial
proceedings and a Report and Recommendation
(“Report”). On July 6, 2016, the Magistrate Judge
issued a Report recommending Defendants’ motion for
partial dismissal be granted as to all challenged claims. ECF
Magistrate Judge advised the parties of the procedures and
requirements for filing objections to the Report and the
serious consequences if they failed to do so. Mensack filed
objections on July 26, 2016. ECF No. 24. Defendants filed a
response on August 12, 2016. ECF No. 27. The matter is now
ripe for resolution.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility for making a final determination remains with
the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
The court is charged with making a de novo determination of
any portion of the Report to which a specific objection is
made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit
the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the
court reviews only for clear error. See Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “in the absence of a
timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a
de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’”) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee’s note)).
reasons explained below, the court adopts both the reasoning
and recommendation of the Report. Defendants’ motion
for partial dismissal is, therefore, granted.
ADA and SCHAL-based Claims
Report recommends Mensack’s claims be dismissed to the
extent they rely on either the ADA or SCHAL. ECF No. 22 at
5-7, 11-13. This would dispose of the Third cause of action
in full and limit the First and Second causes of action to
reliance on Title VII.
does not address these recommendations in her objections. The
court has, therefore, reviewed the Report for plain error as
to these recommendations. Finding none, the court adopts the
reasoning and recommendations of the Report and dismisses the
First and Second causes of action to the extent they rely ...