United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division
OPINION AND ORDER
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE Senior United States District Judge.
matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on
June 17, 2015. ECF No. 1. On January 29, 2016, Defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 34. A
Roseboro order was entered by the court and mailed
to Plaintiff on February 1, 2016, advising Plaintiff of the
importance of a dispositive motion and the need for Plaintiff
to file an adequate response. ECF No. 35. After an extension
of time to respond, Plaintiff filed his response in
opposition on March 16, 2016. ECF No. 40.
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule
73.02 (B)(2)(d), DSC, this matter was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant for pre-trial
proceedings and a Report and Recommendation
(“Report”). On April 6, 2016, the Magistrate
Judge issued a Report recommending that Defendants’
motion for summary judgment be granted and the case dismissed
based on the statute of limitations and qualified immunity.
ECF No. 42. The Magistrate Judge advised the Parties of the
procedures and requirements for filing objections to the
Report and the serious consequences if they failed to do so.
After receiving two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed
objections to the Report on June 28, 2016. ECF No. 50.
Defendants did not file objections.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
The court is charged with making a de novo determination of
any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a
specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the
Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. §
presents several objections to the Report. After de novo
review of the objections, the court adopts in part the
Report, finding that the statute of limitations expired
before Plaintiff filed his claims.
in his first objection, argues that the Factual Background
section presents a complete review of Defendants’
version of the facts, while giving a “cursory
review” of Plaintiff’s opposition. As the summary
judgment motion is decided on the basis of a legal argument,
not a factual one, the court finds that this objection is
without merit and does not affect the outcome.
Statute of Limitations
next addresses the statute of limitations issue, arguing that
the Report erred when determining the date on which the
statute of limitations for his § 1983 claim accrued. ECF
No. 50 at 2.
is well-settled on this question of statutes of limitation
for actions brought under § 1983. While a statute of
limitations is not contained within the text of § 1983,
the Supreme Court has decided that the state’s general
statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies,
even if the state has different statutes of limitation for
intentional torts. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 253,
249-50 (1989) (“We accordingly hold that where state
law provides multiple statutes of limitation for personal
injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should
borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury
actions.”); see also Owens v. Baltimore City
State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.
2014) (“[T]o determine the timely filing of a §
1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations from the
most analogous state-law cause of action. For § 1983
suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury
Carolina law allows three years for a plaintiff to bring a
personal injury action. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (5).
Therefore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims
arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the
underlying allegations of the § 1983 claim. See
Hamilton v. Middleton, No. 4:02-1952-23, 2003 WL
23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003).