United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division
Tequan L. Brown, Plaintiff,
Andy Strickland, Jodie Taylor, Matthew Walker, and Colleton County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
L Brown, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
Strickland, Defendant, represented by Otto Edworth Liipfert,
III, Griffith Sadler and Sharp.
Taylor, Defendant, represented by Otto Edworth Liipfert, III,
Griffith Sadler and Sharp.
Colleton County Sheriff's Office, Defendant, represented
by Otto Edworth Liipfert, III, Griffith Sadler and Sharp.
OPINION & ORDER
TIMOTHY M. CAIN, District Judge.
Tequan L. Brown ("Brown"), an inmate proceeding pro
se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
64). Brown filed a response to
Defendants' motion (ECF No. 34). On May 31, 2016, the
magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation
("Report") in which she recommended that
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
Motion be granted. (ECF No. 75). Brown timely filed
objections. (ECF No. 77). Defendants filed a reply to
Brown's objections. (ECF No. 79). Brown has also filed a
motion to make the attachments he filed with his complaint in
another case, C/A No.0:14-cv-1759, a part of the record in
the instant action, and motions to compel and for a hearing.
(ECF No. 78, 82, and 83).
magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71
(1976). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which
specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the
magistrate judge, or recommit the matter with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every
portion of the magistrate judge's report to which
objections have been filed. Id. However, the court
need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only
"general and conclusory objections that do not direct
the court to a specific error in the magistrate's
proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of a timely filed, specific objection, the magistrate
judge's conclusions are reviewed only for clear error.
See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
Complaint, Brown, a pretrial detainee at the Colleton County
Detention Center ("CCDC"), alleges constitutional
claims relating to the conditions of his confinement.
Specifically, he alleges he has been confined to his cell for
23 hours a day, six days a week, and a full 24 hours one day
a week without any cause. (Compl. at 3-4, 5, 6, 7). He
alleges the showers are not clean and, that while in his
cell, he is exposed to rust, dust, and black mold due to an
inadequate ventilation system. (Compl. at 5). He also alleges
that he has not had access to his attorney and his attorney
has been negligent by violating his speedy trial rights and
his rights to life and liberty. (Compl. at 6, 7). Finally, he
alleges his personal mail has been withheld and that he has
been denied access to a phone, television, radio, and
newspapers. (Compl. at 7). He seeks an investigation of the
CCDC by the Department of Justice, the dismissal of all
indictments against him, the impeachment of Sheriff Andy
Strickland, and damages. (Compl. at 8).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is
to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn
in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted." Id. at 248. A litigant
"cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through
mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214
(4th Cir. 1985). "Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is
appropriate." Monahan v. County of
Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th Cir. 1996).
the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a
prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions
under § 1983, or any other federal law, must first exhaust
all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e)(a). Exhaustion as provided in § 1997(e)(a) is
mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741
(2001). The exhaustion of administrative remedies
"applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
" and is required even when the relief sought is not
available. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. Because
exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit, all available
administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a
complaint in federal court. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741.
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings."
Woodford v. Ngo,548 U.S. 81 (2006). "An
inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by ...