United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Aiken Division
Bryan Harwell United States District Judge
Kelvin Richardson, who was a state pretrial detainee at the
time he commenced this action,  filed a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the above named Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
See ECF No. 1. The matter is before the Court for
review of the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of United
States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges, made in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02 for
the District of South Carolina. See R & R, ECF No.
47. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court grant
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. R & R at
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with
this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,
270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the R & R to which
specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
parties have filed objections to the R & R, and the time
for doing so has expired. In the absence of objections to the R
& R, the Court is not required to give any explanation
for adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations.
See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir.
1983). The Court reviews only for clear error in the absence
of an objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a
district court need not conduct de novo review, but instead
must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation’” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72
advisory committee’s note)).
thorough review of the record in this case, the Court finds
no clear error. Accordingly, the Court adopts and
incorporates by reference the R & R [ECF No. 47] of the
Magistrate Judge. It is therefore ORDERED that
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 37] is
GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 42] is DENIED.
 Plaintiff was incarcerated at the
Greenville County Detention Center when he filed his
complaint. See ECF No. 1-1 (envelope). He
subsequently submitted a notice of change of address
indicating he is no longer incarcerated. See ECF No.
 The Magistrate Judge reviewed
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
The Court is mindful of its duty to liberally construe the
pleadings of pro se litigants. See Gordon v. Leeke,
574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“Principles requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not, however, without limits. Gordon
directs district courts to construe pro se complaints
liberally. It does not require those courts to conjure up
questions never squarely presented to them.”).
 Objections were due by July 29, 2016.
See ECF No. 47.
 The Magistrate Judge analyzed
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim solely under
the Eighth Amendment. See R & R at 7-8. However,
because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and not a convicted
prisoner, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-not the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of
the Eighth Amendment-governs his deliberate indifference
claim. See Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th
Cir. 1987) (“[W]hile the Eighth Amendment is properly
invoked on behalf of those convicted of crimes, it is the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that applies to
pretrial detainees . . ..”). In any event, the
Magistrate Judge properly relied on Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in analyzing Plaintiff’s claim. See
Turner v. Kight, 121 F. App’x 9, 13 (4th Cir.
2005) (“While a pre-trial detainee’s rights with
respect to claims of deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs are prohibited by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, with
respect to such claims, a pretrial detainee’s due
process rights are co-extensive with a convicted
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment ...