United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Beeson, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISTOW MARCHANT, Magistrate Judge.
a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Henry Beeson, pro se,
Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Complaint on April 27,
Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, this filing is
subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this
Court to ensure that a plaintiff has standing; that subject
matter jurisdiction exists; and that a case is not
frivolous. See Ross v. Baron, 493
F.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); Fitzgerald v.
First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,
363-64 (2d Cir. 2000): see also Pillav v. INS, 45
F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995)[noting that although 28 U.S.C.
Â§ 1915(d) was not applicable where a pro se party filed an
appeal and paid the filing fee, the court had "inherent
authority, wholly aside from any statutory warrant, to
dismiss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous"].
Therefore, this Complaint is subject to review pursuant to
the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject
matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not
frivolous. See, e.g., Carter v. Ervin, No.
0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014).
appeal dism'd, 585 F.Appx. 98 (4th Cir. 2014);
Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL
397449, *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007), adopted by, 2007 WL 4952430
(D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007), aff'd, 251 F.Appx. 246 (2007).
cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1057 (2008).
complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is
charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro
se litigant to allow the development of a potentially
meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not
mean that a court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading
to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a
federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (outlining
pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). The
mandated liberal construction afforded to gro se pleadings
means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to
state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it
should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a
complaint to include claims that were never presented,
Bamett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999),
construct the plaintiffs legal arguments for him, Small
v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), or
"conjure up questions never squarely presented" to
the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
the Complaint in this case can fairly be characterized by
what some courts have described as "buzzwords" or
"legalistic gibberish." See, e.g., Rochester v.
McKic, No. 8:11-797, 2011 WL 2671228, at * 1 (D.S.C. July 8,
2011) (citing Yocum v. Summers, No. 91-3648, 1991 WL
171389, at * 1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 30, 1991)). Although Plaintiff
mentions numerous statutes and purports to allege
twenty-eight claims for relief, his allegations are so
generally incomprehensible and filled with what could only be
considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory,
and unsupported comments or "gibberish, " that it
is unclear what is to be made of them. See Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) [Noting that
federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are
"so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit"]; see also Livingston v. Adirondack
Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2nd Cir. 1998); Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) [Affirming dismissal of
plaintiff's suit as frivolous where allegations were
conclusory and nonsensical on their face].
Plaintiff has failed to include sufficiently clear factual
allegations against the named Defendant to maintain this
action. While Plaintiff discusses numerous individuals,
government agencies, and entities in the narrative of his
Complaint (if it can be characterized in that way), he fails
to allege any personal responsibility or personal wrongdoing
in connection with the alleged violations of any of
Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights,
Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint is in violation of the
directive in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) that
pleadings shall contain "a short and plain
statement" of the basis for the court's jurisdiction
and of the basis for a plaintiffs claims against each
defendant. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) [requiring, in order to avoid dismissal,
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.'"]. Additionally, it is also
unclear from the Complaint what relief Plaintiff is
requesting. Although he included a "Request for
Relief" section in his complaint, he merely wrote;
All I want is what is required by Law for the following
violations of these Laws "Title 15. USC 1&2. Title 18
USC 241. 242. 371. 2384. 2385. and Title 42 USC 1983. 1984.
1985. 1986" and I also need the Court to follow the Law
for Title 18 USC 3771. I feel that these Corporate Entities,
Agents and Individuals will come after me for anything they
can for me filing this case against them for my Civil Rights.
According to my research the figure that is in my claim is
correct in its amount.
1 at 41. As such, were this Court to find that Plaintiffs
rights have been violated, but order no remedy, it would, in
effect, be rendering an advisory opinion, which is barred by
Article III of the Constitution. Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975): see also Norvell v. Sanere de
Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir. 1975)
[federal courts do not render advisory opinions].
while Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983, section 1983 "is not itself a
source of substantive rights, ' but merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S.
137, 144n. 3 (1979)). However, Plaintiff has failed to
allege any comprehensible claim that any of his rights under
the Constitution or the laws of the United States have been
violated. Although Plaintiff also requests relief under 42
U.S.C. Â§ 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), he
has made no allegations of a conspiracy of any type or a
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. In any event, the
Supreme Court has held that in order to maintain a claim
under Â§ 1985, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
conspiracy was motivated by "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory
animus." Griffin v. Breckenridee, 403 U.S. 88,
102(1971); see 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1985(3); see also Trerice v.
Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1084 (4th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff
has not alleged a racial basis for his claim of conspiracy.
also alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1984. However, he has
no possible claim under this statute, as it has been omitted
from the U.S. Code. See 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1984. As for Plaintiffs
requested relief for violations of "Title 15 USC 1 &
2;" ECF No. 1 at 41; Plaintiff has failed to state a
cause of action under these antitrust statutes.
also states that he is requesting relief for violations of 18
U.S.C. Â§Â§ 241, 242 371, 2384, and 2385. However, these are
criminal statues that do not give rise to civil liability or
authorize a private right of action. See United States v.
Oguaju, 76 F.Appx. 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003)[finding that
the District Court properly dismissed defendant's claim
filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 241 and 242 because he had no
private right of action under either of those criminal
statutes]; Farris v. Garden City, No. 15-1078-MLB, 2015 WL
3949244, *3 (D.Kan. June 29, 2015)[Seetion 2385 "is a
criminal statue, which does not provide for a private cause
of action."]; Horn v. Brennen, 840 F.Supp.2d
576, 582 (E.D.N.Y.2011)[criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Â§
371 does not provide for aprivate cause of action]; Keyter v.
Bush, No. 08-97, 2008 WL 613129 (D. Del. Mar. 5, 2008)
[noting that 18 U.S.C. Â§ 2384, a criminal statute concerning
seditious conspiracy, does "not provide a private right
of action"]. Although Plaintiff asserts that he
needs the Court to "follow" 18 U.S.C. Â§ 3771, which
concerns crime victims' rights, he fails to allege any
facts indicating that he was a crime victim or that this
statute was not "followed, " Additionally, to the
extent that Plaintiff is requesting a criminal prosecution,
it is well settled that individuals such as the Plaintiff
here have no constitutional right to, or in fact any
judicially cognizable interest in, the criminal process or
non-prosecution of another person. See Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)[A private citizen
does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another person]; Diamond
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) [applying
Linda R.S. v. Richard D . and collecting cases];
Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333, 340 (D.Nev.
1993) ["Long ago the courts of these United States
established that criminal statutes cannot be enforced by
may be attempting to litigate or re-litigate matters
pertaining to a state court foreclosure action which he,
along with his mother (Florine Beeson), attempted previously
to remove to this court (the action was remanded to the state
court). See Bank of America v. Beeson, No. 2:15-ev-02926-RMG
(D.S.C.). However, as noted in that action,
Henry Beeson was not a party to the action that was removed
and thus lacked authority to remove that action. See
Sizelove-Farroer v. Johnson, No. 1:13-cv-03041-JMC, 2014 WL
4056267 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2014)[granting the plaintiffs motion
to remand where state court action was removed by non-party
insurance company even though it claimed it had the right to
appear on behalf of the defendant as a real party in
interest]; Andersen v. Khanna, 827 F.Supp.2d 970,
974 (S.D. Iowa 2011) [finding that "[a] non-party to a
state court proceeding has no right to remove that proceeding
to federal court.... This is true even if the non-party has
an interest or a stake in the proceedings."](citations
omitted); In re Notice of Removal by William
Einhorn, 481 F.Supp.2d 345, 348 (D.N.J. 2007)[opining
that "[t]o interpret defendant' to include
non-parties would produce an absurd result and would
contravene more than 65 years of jurisprudence that has only
allowed removal by defendants' to claims asserted by a
plaintiff."]. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is
attempting in this action to assert any claims on behalf of
his mother or the "House & Family of Beeson" (see
ECF No. 1 at 52; Plaintiff's All. ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 3
at 10), he may not do so. See Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 482 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
99 (1968)[a district court, when determining whether a
plaintiff has standing to sue, must focus on the status of
the party who has filed the complaint, such that the merits
of the case are irrelevant]; Lake Carriers Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972).
to the extent that Plaintiff may be requesting monetary
damages, the State of South Carolina is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to
entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of
South Carolina, its integral parts, or its officials in their
official capacities, by a citizen of South Carolina or a
citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996)(reaffirming Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10
(1890) [holding that a citizen could not sue a state in
federal court without the state's consent]; Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984)[although express language of Eleventh Amendment only
forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State,
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its
own citizens]; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 61-71 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 663 (1974) [stating that "when the action is
in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
entitled to invoke its [Eleventh Amendment] sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are
nominal defendants"](quoting Ford ...