United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
Richard Mark Gergel United States District Court Judge.
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
of the Magistrate Judge, recommending summary judgment for
Respondent. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts
the Report and Recommendation as the Order of the Court,
grants Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and
dismisses the petition for habeas relief.
is a federal prisoner at FCI Bennettsville, South Carolina.
On March 27, 2009, Petitioner was arrested in Puerto Rico for
illegal re-entry after deportation. He was sentenced on June
15, 2009, to an eight-month term of imprisonment upon
revocation of his supervised release term. With prior custody
credit, his projected release date was November 25, 2009,
and, on November 25, 2009, he was released to the Department
of Homeland Security on an immigration detainer. Petitioner
was deported to his home country, the Dominican Republic, on
December 16, 2009.
Petitioner's release was an error. On September 16, 2009,
Petitioner had been sentenced to a 3 3-month term of
imprisonment for reentry after deportation subsequent to the
commission of an aggravated felony-specifically, smuggling
marijuana. Plea Agreement, United States v. Argents
Bataldo-Castillo, Crim. No. 3:09-162-GAG (D.P.R. May 5,
2009) (hereinafter "Case No. 09-162"), That
sentence was to be served consecutively to the eight-month
sentence for supervised release revocation. Because the
judgment in Case No. 09-162 was not properly reported to the
Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), it was not used when BOP
computed Petitioner's sentence. When released and
deported, Petitioner did not inform the Government that he
had another sentence to serve.
6, 2010, Petitioner was again arrested in Puerto Rico. He was
apprehended offshore while smuggling cocaine from the
Dominican Republic into the United States. Plea Agreement,
United States v. Argenis Bataldo-Castillo, Crim. No,
3;10-253-GAG (D.P.I. Sept. 26, 2011) (hereinafter "Case
No. 10-253"). On January 17, 2012, he was sentenced to a
96-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine. The BOP computed that sentence
together with the 33-month sentence in Case No. 09-162 for an
aggregate 129-month term of imprisonment commencing on July
September 15, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for
habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 2241. Petitioner
claims that his sentence computation is erroneous on two
grounds. First, he claims that he should receive credit for
the time spent at liberty due to his mistaken release from
custody on November 25, 2009 (he also claims that his time in
immigration detention, November 25, 2009 to December 16,
2009, is "official detention" which should count
toward his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585).
Second, he claims that he should receive credit for time
served from his July 6, 2010 arrest to his January 17, 2012
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261
(1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The Court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. §
proper objection is made to a particular issue, "a
district court is required to consider all arguments directed
to that issue, regardless of whether they were raised before
the magistrate." United States v.
George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992).
However, "[t]he district court's decision whether to
consider additional evidence is committed to its discretion,
and any refusal will be reviewed for abuse." Doe
v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 183 & n.9 (4th Cir.
2002). "[A]ttempts to introduce new evidence after the
magistrate judge has acted are disfavored, " though the
district court may allow it "when a party offers
sufficient reasons for so doing." Caldwell v.
Jackson, 831 F.Supp.2d 911, 914 (M.D. N.C. 2010)
judgment is appropriate if a party "shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In other words, summary judgment should
be granted "only when it is clear that there is no
dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the
inferences to be drawn from those facts." Pulliam
Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.
1987). "In determining whether a genuine issue has been
raised, the court must construe all inferences and
ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party."
HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'l Red
Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996). The party
seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the
non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment,
may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings.
Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must
demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give
rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard,
"[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
nor does a 'mere scintilla of evidence'" in
support of the non-moving party's case. Thompson