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Fox v. The Ritz Carlton Corporation

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

February 12, 2016

Glynndeavin von Fox, Plaintiff,
v.
The Ritz Carlton Corporation, Defendant.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.

         Pending is the pro se Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis" ("IFP"). (DE# 3). In the fourteenth of many civil actions recently filed by Plaintiff in this Court, Plaintiff sues the Ritz Carlton Corporation.[1] Pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the complaint and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge.[2] Upon review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP be denied and that the case be summarily dismissed for the following reasons:

         I. Relevant Law

         A. Liberal Construction for Pro se filings

         This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam).). The liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

         B. Applications to Proceed IFP

         A plaintiff may pursue a civil action in federal court without prepayment of the filing fee if he submits an affidavit containing a statement of his assets and demonstrates that he cannot afford to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The purpose of the IFP statute is to assure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to pay the filing fee. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982). A plaintiff does not have to prove that he is "absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute." Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).

         An affidavit to proceed IFP is sufficient if it states facts indicating that the plaintiff cannot afford to pay the filing fee. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. If a court determines at any time that the allegation of poverty in an IFP application is not true, then the court "shall dismiss the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A); and see, e.g., Justice v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 1801949 (E.D. N.C. May 17, 2012) ("dismissal is mandatory if the court concludes that an applicant's allegation of poverty is untrue"), aff'd by, 479 F.Appx. 451 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1657 (2013); Berry v. Locke, 2009 WL 1587315, *5 (E.D.Va. June 5, 2009) ("Even if Berry's misstatements were made in good faith, her case is subject to dismissal because her allegation of poverty was untrue"), appeal dismissed, 357 F.Appx. 513 (4th Cir. 2009). Prior to statutory amendment in 1996, courts had discretion to dismiss a case if it determined that an allegation of poverty was untrue. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992). The 1996 amendment changed the words "may dismiss" to "shall dismiss." Mandatory dismissal is now the majority view, and district courts in the Fourth Circuit have adhered to the majority view. See, e.g., Justice, 2012 WL 1801949, *6 n.5; Staten v. Tekelec, 2011 WL 2358221, *1 (E.D. N.C. June 9, 2011); Berry, 2009 WL 1587315, *5.

         II. Discussion

         A. IFP Not Warranted

         In his IFP motion dated January 12, 2016, Plaintiff indicates that he is employed by "Fox Consulting Firm, LLC" and that his "take-home pay or wages" are $1, 200.00 monthly. (DE# 3, ¶ 2). On the printed form, he checks boxes indicating that in the past 12 months, he has received income from (a) business, profession, or other self-employment; (b) rent payments, interest, or dividends; (d) disability or worker's compensation payments; and (e) gifts or inheritances. ( Id. ¶ 3). Plaintiff explains that the amount he received for (a) was $50.00; (b) $1, 200.00; (d) $1, 200.00; and (e) $500.00. ( Id. ). He indicates that he has $800.00 in his bank account. ( Id. ¶ 4).[3] Plaintiff also indicates he has assets valued at $140, 000.00. ( Id. ¶ 5).

         Plaintiff indicates he has no expenses for "housing, transportation, utilities, or loan payments, or other regular monthly expenses" and no debts or other financial obligations. ( Id. ¶¶ 6, 8). Plaintiff indicates he has monthly income of $1, 200.00, assets of $140, 000.00, and no debts or other monthly expenses, which suggests that he has the ability to pay the filing fee. See, e.g., Justice, 2012 WL 1801949, *3 (denying IFP status where plaintiff indicated he owned real and personal property with a total value of $113, 500.00 because "the benefit of filing IFP was not intended to allow individuals with significant real and personal property interests to avoid paying a filing fee of $350.00 in each case"). In his Complaint, Plaintiff also indicates that in 2013 he travelled to Japan, stayed in a $900.00 per night executive suite, had stayed in other five star hotels, rented a Mercedes automobile, wore his Ralph Lauren Black Label suits, and dined on Kobe beef, sushi, and plum wine. (DE# 1 at 4-7). Taken as true, these are not the spending habits of a person unable to afford a filing fee.

         Based on the record presently before the Court, it appears that Plaintiff can pay the filing fee. This case should therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A). See also Justice, 2012 WL 1801949, at *5 (denying IFP status because plaintiff could pay the filing fee and dismissing four civil lawsuits by the same pro se plaintiff); Thomas v. GMAC, 288 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir.2002) ("Because the allegation of poverty was false, the suit had to be dismissed; the judge had no choice."); Cabbil v. United States, Case No. 1:14-cv-04122-JMC-PJG, 2015 WL 6905072, *1 (summarily dismissing without prejudice; plaintiff not entitled to proceed IFP); Willingham v. Cline, 2013 WL 4774789 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (same).[4]

         B. The Complaint Fails to Set Forth a Basis for Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Fails to State a Claim, and ...


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