United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.
The Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Petitioner asserts that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") did not award him sufficient prior custody credit towards his federal sentence. This matter is before the court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 18.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., this Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the instant petition for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The Petitioner filed this habeas action on December 9, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 3, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 18.) By order filed the following day, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Petitioner was advised of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 19.) On July 9, 2015, Petitioner filed his Response to Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 21.)
The Petitioner is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Estill, South Carolina. The material facts leading up to Petitioner's habeas petition are not in dispute. On August 16, 1999, the Petitioner was arrested by Florida state authorities for home invasion, robbery while armed and kidnapping. On January 10, 2001, the Petitioner was sentenced in the Hernando County Circuit Court of Florida to 15 years imprisonment. (Dkt. Nos.18 at 2; 21 at 2.) On February 20, 2001, while in state custody, the Petitioner was transferred to federal custody pursuant to a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.)
On April 30, 2002, the Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to 348 months of imprisonment for Conspiracy to Interfere with Commerce by Threat or Violence, Interference with Commerce by Threat or Violence, and Possession of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence. ( Id.; Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) The federal sentence was ordered to run concurrently to the state sentence already imposed. ( Id. ) After the federal sentence was imposed, the Petitioner was returned to state custody.
On May 2, 2002, the state court amended the Petitioner's original sentence in an order stating that his state sentence was to run concurrently with his federal sentence. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2; 18 at 3.) On May 21, 2012, the Petitioner was released by the state of Florida and taken into federal custody to satisfy the remainder of his sentence. (Dkt Nos. 1 at 2-3, 18 at 3.)
Upon the Petitioner's arrival into BOP custody, the BOP prepared a sentence computation for his federal term of imprisonment. That sentence is based on a 348-month term of imprisonment beginning on the date it was imposed on April 30, 2002, thereby allowing concurrent service of the state and federal terms in accordance with the court's judgment. (Dkt Nos. 1 at 3; 18 at 3.) The Petitioner received credit toward the 348-month federal sentence from the date of his arrest on August 16, 1999, until the day before the Florida state sentence commenced on January 9, 2001, in accordance with Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971). ( Id. )
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Facts are material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
The undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 18) be granted. The Petitioner argues he is entitled to credit towards his federal sentence from January 10, 2001, the date the state sentence began, through April 20, 2002, the date he received his federal sentence. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 6.) The Petitioner contends that because the state court amended his state sentence on May 2, 2002 to have his state sentence run concurrently to his federal sentence, he is now entitled to credit for the time he was serving his state sentence starting January 10, 2001.
When a court imposes a federal criminal sentence, the BOP is responsible for computing the inmate's term of imprisonment. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992) (recognizing that the United States Attorney General has delegated this authority to the BOP); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.96. Calculation of a federal sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585 and requires that the BOP (1) ascertain the date on which the federal sentence commences and (2) ...