United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
May 11, 2015
Samuel Wilder, #258295, Petitioner,
Leroy Cartledge, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
CAMERON McGOWAN CURRIE, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court on the pro se application for writ of habeas corpus, filed in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(c), DSC, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker for pre-trial proceedings and a Report and Recommendation ("Report"). On April 27, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that this matter be dismissed without prejudice as this court is without jurisdiction to entertain it. Petitioner filed objections to the Report on May 11, 2015.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
After conducting a de novo review of the record as to the objections made, and after considering the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and Petitioner's objections, the court agrees with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the court adopts and incorporates the Report and Recommendation by reference in this Order.
Petitioner contends that case law of which he was not aware when he filed his previous petition establishes that he is entitled to relief. However, this argument is incorrect as a matter of law and fails to overcome the infirmities of the petition, namely, that it is a second or successive petition. Title 28, Section 2244(b)(3) places specific restrictions on second or successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Prior to filing a second or successive petition under § 2254, Petitioner must obtain certification by a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowing him to file a second or successive petition. As provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, "[b]efore a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). This he has not done.
This petition is successive in nature. As this court is without jurisdiction to consider it, it is dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process upon Respondent.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The governing law provides that:
(c)(2) A certificate of appealability may issue... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(c)(3) The certificate of appealability... shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find this court's assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, the legal standard for the issuance of a certificate of appealability has not been met. Therefore, a certificate of appealability is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.