United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.
Paul Leslie Cox ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is a prisoner committed to the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), and he is incarcerated at McCormick Correctional Institution. The Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Petitioner brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and he requests that his conviction by a jury of possession of contraband entered in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions on August 4, 1987, be vacated for a new trial. [Doc. 1 at 1-3, 11.] He states that he received a 10-year sentence. [Doc. 1 at 2-3.] Petitioner seems to contend that his indictment was wrongfully enhanced, and the conviction was illegal because the contraband law did not take effect until 2004 within SCDC. [Doc. 1 at 8-10.]
This Court takes judicial notice that Petitioner previously has filed a § 2254 habeas action related to the same 1987 conviction of possession of contraband, and this Court dismissed it as untimely with prejudice. See Cox v. McCabe ["Cox I"], C/A No. 3:11-3113-TMC-JRM, 2012 WL 77017, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2012); see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'"). Petitioner filed an appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, denied Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel, and denied a certificate of appealability. Cox v. McCabe, 473 F.Appx. 274 (4th Cir. 2012).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Petitioner filed this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute authorizes the Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, is frivolous or malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012); see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254). As a pro se litigant, Petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA") amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and other habeas statutes.
The AEDPA effected a number of substantial changes regarding the availability of federal postconviction relief to individuals convicted of crimes in federal and state courts. Of particular importance here are the provisions of the AEDPA codifying and extending judicially constructed limits on the consideration of second and successive applications for collateral relief. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651... (1996). Under the AEDPA, an individual may not file a second or successive § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus or § 2255 motion to vacate sentence without first receiving permission to do so from the appropriate circuit court of appeals.
In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted). The "gatekeeping" mechanism created by the AEDPA amended § 2244(b) to provide:
The prospective applicant must file in the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the district court. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel has 30 days to determine whether "the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of" § 2244(b). § 2244(b)(3)(C); see §§ 2244(b)(3)(B), (D).
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996).
Here, although Petitioner entitled his habeas action as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this Court finds that justice requires the Petition to be recharacterized as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner seeks to vacate his conviction of possession of contraband entered in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions on August 4, 1987, in order to obtain a new trial. Because Petitioner is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, he cannot evade the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by filing an action purporting to be a § 2241 petition. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2004). Section 2254 applies to a subset of those to whom § 2241(c)(3) applies, that is, "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court' who is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Id. at 786 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added)). If a person is in state custody pursuant to something other than a state court judgment, for example a state pre-trial bond order, then his habeas petition is not governed by § 2254. Id. at 787. If this were not the case, then "a state prisoner could simply opt out of its  operation by choosing a different label for his petition." Id. (citing Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also Castro v. ...