In the Matter of John Brooks Reitzel, Jr., Respondent
Submitted February 3, 2015
Appellate Case No. 2014-002700.
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Barbara M. Seymour, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
John Brooks Reitzel, Jr., of High Point, North Carolina, Pro se.
[411 S.C. 423] PER CURIAM
In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to the
imposition of a bar to admission of any kind in South Carolina for a definite or indefinite period of time to be determined by the Court. Further, respondent [411 S.C. 424] consents to the imposition of a bar to advertising and solicitation directed to South Carolina residents or entities and a bar to advertising and solicitation for any legal matters in South Carolina, both for a definite or indefinite period of time to be determined by the Court. We accept the Agreement and permanently debar respondent from seeking any form of admission to practice law in this state (including pro hac vice admission) without first obtaining an order from this Court allowing him to seek admission. Further, we prohibit respondent from any advertising or solicitation in South Carolina whether in general or directed to residents or entities in South Carolina without first obtaining an order from this Court allowing him to advertise or solicit business in this state. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.
Respondent is licensed to practice law and is in good standing in North Carolina. He is not, and has never been, licensed to practice law in South Carolina.
On August 10, 2011, respondent filed an answer on behalf of defendants in a foreclosure action pending in Charleston County, South Carolina, involving property located in South Carolina. Default was subsequently entered against the defendants in the matter. On November 1, 2011, respondent sent a letter opposing the default order to the presiding judge on behalf of the defendants.
At the time respondent filed the answer in the foreclosure matter, he had not applied for pro hac vice status in the matter, he was not admitted pro hac vice in the matter, and he was not otherwise permitted to make an appearance in court in South Carolina. Further, respondent's actions in representing the defendants in the foreclosure matter were not undertaken in association with an attorney admitted to practice law in South Carolina.
On November 3, 2011, counsel for the plaintiff wrote to respondent asking for verification that he was eligible to appear in court in South Carolina. Respondent responded with a letter dated November 8, 2011, acknowledging that he was not licensed to practice law in South Carolina, but stating that he " frequently practice[s] in South Carolina civil matters [411 S.C. 425] ... involving foreclosure proceedings and deficiency claims." He further stated that, prior to counsel's letter, he ...