Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Campbell v. Rite Aid Corporation

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

August 5, 2014

ROBERT H. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff,
v.
RITE AID CORPORATION and THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE HOWE HENDRICKS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Rite Aid Corporation's motion to dismiss and strike the jury demand (ECF No. 8). Defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America joined the motion to dismiss with regard to causes of action 3-6 and the request to strike Plaintiff's jury trial demand. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court grants the Defendants' motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert H. Campbell filed this ERISA action against Defendants Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite Aid") and The Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") on August 27, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. Defendants removed the case to this Court on September 26, 2013. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was employed as a pharmacist with Defendant Rite Aid, and, as a part of his employment, obtained accidental dismemberment insurance through a policy (the "Policy") issued by Defendant Prudential as a part of an ERISA qualified plan (the "Plan"). (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 28, 2011, while sitting at his desk at work, he "slipped and caught himself" and the movement caused a stitch in an eye implant that had been placed in April of 1999 to become dislodged. ( Id. ¶ 6, 8.) As a result of the dislodged stitch, Plaintiff underwent surgery during which he "became totally blind." ( Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff submitted a claim on the Policy seeking accidental dismemberment benefits. In a letter dated April 18, 2012, Defendant Prudential denied Plaintiff's claim and provided the following explanation:

If not for the cataract surgery, you could not have had [t]he dislocated intraocular lens implant in April 2011 and in December 2011 that resulted in your loss of sight in the left eye. Therefore, your loss did result indirectly from sickness (Cataract) and directly from complications of surgical treatment (Cataract Surgery Left Eye with Intraocular Lens Placement on 4/7/99) of sickness."

( Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Prudential referred Plaintiff to language in the Policy stating that a loss would be covered if, "[y]ou sustain an accidental bodily injury while a covered person, the loss results directly from that injury and from no other cause[, ]" and if "[y]ou suffer the loss within 365 days of the accident." Prudential further indicated that the Policy excluded from coverage losses that resulted from sickness and medical or surgical treatment of sickness. ( Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Prudential lacks a proper basis for denial of his claim and filed this action against Prudential and Rite Aid to recover benefits under the Policy. Plaintiff also claims that he is entitled to benefits as a result of certain statements or omissions made by Rite Aid regarding the Policy.

Defendant Rite Aid filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to strike Plaintiff's jury demand (ECF No. 8) on October 24, 2013. Defendant Prudential joined the motion to strike the jury demand and to dismiss causes of action 3-6 (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 15) on November 19, 2013, and Defendants filed replies on December 9, 2013 (ECF Nos. 20 & 21).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plaintiff's complaint should set forth "a short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 "does not require detailed factual allegations, ' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To show that the plaintiff is "entitled to relief, " the complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions, " and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff...." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Notably, "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" do not qualify as well pled facts.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must state "a plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Stated differently, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Still, Rule 12(b)(6) "does not countenance... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations." Colon Health Centers of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). "A plausible but inconclusive inference from pleaded facts will survive a motion to dismiss...." Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J.).

DISCUSSION

I. CAUSES OF ACTION 1 AND 2

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action fail to state a claim against Defendant Rite Aid. As Rite Aid points out, the parties agree that the accidental dismemberment benefits that Plaintiff seeks are insured by Defendant Prudential, and Plaintiff has asserted no basis for imposing liability on Defendant Rite Aid. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that it was Defendant Prudential who wrongly denied his claim for benefits. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11, 20, 29, and 30.) It is not clear from the complaint what, if any, role Rite Aid played in this decision. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to respond to Rite Aid's argument regarding causes of action 1 and 2, and the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.