United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE W. DIXON, Magistrate Judge.
The Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 48.)
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
The Plaintiff brought this action on or about June 6, 2013; Plaintiff amended his Complaint on or about November 20, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 33.) On January 20, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 48.) By order filed January 21, 2014, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison , 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Plaintiff was advised of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 49.) Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition on or about February 18, 2014. (Dkt. No. 52.)
Plaintiff, who is confined at Perry Correctional Institution ("Perry" or "PCI") of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process when Associate Director Michael McCall transferred Plaintiff from general population at Lee Correctional Institution ("Lee" or "LCI") to Perry where "where all [Plaintiff's] property was confiscated and privileges were revoked." (Dkt. No. 33 at 1 of 3.) Plaintiff alleges he was housed in the Special Management Unit ("SMU") of Perry from November 9, 2012, to January 4, 2013, "without any disciplinary detention time, pending charges, investigation notice, or hearing." (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was given a hearing on January 4, 2013, but "57 days housed on SMU without a hearing is not considered a reasonable time' and therefore [his] due process" rights were violated. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that his due process rights were violated when Defendants Carteldge, Mauney, and Ogunsile "made the decision" to classify Plaintiff "as a security threat based solely on hearsay' information." (Id.) It appears that Plaintiff is currently assigned to administrative segregation and is in the SMU. (Dkt. No. 33 at 2 of 4.)
Plaintiff also complains about the conditions in the SMU, alleging he is only allowed three showers per week "that can be taken away for any frivolous reasons" and that he "is forced to make 3 small bars of soap last a month (30) days." (Id.) Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that he is only allowed to clean his cell once a week, and that he is "almost never allowed outdoor rec." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he is allowed no access to "outside world media, " such as magazines, and that he is forced to "breathe in dust from the dirty air-vent, toxic fumes when the dorm is being painted, the roof being fixed with tar and gas/mace when a fellow inmate acts out and is sprayed...." (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that on August 12, 2013, an inmate two rooms down went into Crisis Intervention, meaning the light had to stay on in that inmate's cell for 24 hours a day. (Dkt. No. 33 at 3 of 4.) Because Perry's SMU "has 4 rooms connected to one light switch, " Plaintiff asserts that he "was forced to have [his] light on also for 24 hours a day, " causing him to have "severe headaches, eye problems[, ] and psychological injury that [he] now receive[s] medication for." (Id.) Plaintiff additionally complains about being forced to wear "two pair of handcuffs, a belly chain and shackles" during a visit by his mother and brother, " causing him "emotional injury." (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 33 at 4 of 4.)
Summary Judgment Motion Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Facts are material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. , 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id . (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc. , 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).