of specific members, rather than Code, § 114-404, providing for total incapacity to work, and this is true even though the claimant is totally incapacitated at the time. * * *"
In the case of M.T. Reed Construction Company v. Martin, 215 Miss. 472, 61 So.2d 300, 303, the employee was a skilled carpenter who sustained a break of the lower third of the right femur bone. There was evidence of atrophy of the right knee joint, and that upon trying to make an ascent in the performance of his work, the claimant's knee would "flop". The claimant had been unable to perform his duties since his injury, with the exception of doing some light work. The Commission found a permanent and total loss of use of claimant's right leg. The employee filed an appeal alleging that he was totally and permanently disabled, but the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed such appeal and affirmed the award of the Commission, saying:
"The cross-appeal contends that, since Martin is totally and permanently disabled, he is entitled to permanent, total disability for 450 weeks under provisions of subd. (a), Section 8 of said chapter. But the disability with which we deal is occasioned by the loss of the use of the leg, and the maximum period for which recovery is permitted, on that account, is fixed arbitrarily at 175 weeks."
In the case of Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, supra [141 Tex. 78, 170 S.W.2d 464], it appears that the employee suffered from a fracture of the tibia and distal fibula of the right leg. Claimant contended that he was unable to carry on his work and was totally and permanently incapacitated. The Texas Court held:
"Where injury results to a particular member of the body, compensation for the loss of which is specifically provided by statute, the liability of the insurer is limited to that amount, even though the loss of or injury to that particular member actually results in total permanent incapacity of the employee to labor."
Since the Commission has found as a fact that it is only the leg which makes up the respondent's disabling condition, and the leg being scheduled under Section 72-153 of the 1952 Code, the respondent is limited to the scheduled compensation fixed in said statute. We are not at liberty to extend by construction the meaning implicit in the language found in the Workmen's Compensation Act in order to provide a more liberal rule of compensation than that which the legislature has seen fit to adopt. Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Company et al., 189 S.C. 188, 200 S.E. 727.
We conclude that the Industrial Commission was in error in awarding compensation under Section 72-151 of the 1952 Code. Under the testimony and the findings of fact made by the Commission, the respondent was entitled to an award under Section 72-153 of the 1952 Code.
For the reasons herein stated, the lower Court is reversed and this case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for Beaufort County to be by it remanded to the Industrial Commission, with instructions that it render its award in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
STUKES, C.J., and TAYLOR, OXNER and LEGGE, JJ., concur.
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