The opinion of the court was delivered by: Oxner, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order issued by Judge Grimball on August 17, 1957 (1) requiring appellant to appear before the Master of Charleston County for pre-trial examination by respondents; (2) directing the United States Veterans Administration to permit respondents to inspect and make copies of the clinical records of appellant while a patient at the Naval Hospital at Charleston, South Carolina, the Veterans Hospital at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the Veterans Hospital at Augusta, Georgia; (3) directing the Roper Hospital at Charleston to make available for inspection the records of appellant while a patient at that hospital; (4) directing the United States Coast Guard to permit respondents to inspect and copy the service records of appellant; (5) authorizing the respondents to examine by deposition the custodians of the records above set forth and all doctors who treated appellant; (6) staying all proceedings in this cause until respondents have had a reasonable opportunity to examine the foregoing records and take the testimony above mentioned; and (7) vacating an order issued by Judge Grimball on January 19, 1957, similar in most particulars to the one now under review, which was granted upon the ex parte application of respondents.
Appellant brought this action in March, 1956, to recover damages in the sum of $130,000.00 for personal injuries received about 6:00 P.M. on November 19, 1955, when a Chevrolet automobile driven by him collided with the side of an empty flat car blocking a railroad crossing in Charleston County. The Railroad Company and the engineer and conductor in charge of the train were made parties defendant. Appellant alleged that the injuries were caused by the negligence, recklessness and willfullness of the Railroad Company, its agents and servants. The defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint and further set up a plea of contributory negligence, recklessness and willfullness.
It appears from an affidavit by one of respondents' attorneys that appellant was an enlisted man in the United States Coast Guard from 1942 through 1944, during which period he was confined on several occasions in the Naval Hospital at Charleston; that he was discharged from the Coast Guard because of physical disability and a neuro-psychiatric condition; that he made claim for service-connected disability benefits, including a claim for injuries to his legs and feet; that after being discharged from the service he was confined in the Naval Hospital at Charleston from September 26 to October 14, 1953, and for a week in November, 1955; that the accident out of which this action arose occurred only two days after he had been discharged from the Naval Hospital; that for injuries received in the accident he was treated at the Roper Hospital in Charleston; that on April 16, 1956, while at Plymouth, Michigan, he fell and fractured one of his legs and was confined in the Veterans Hospital at Ann Arbor from that date to May 4, 1956, after which he returned to Charleston and was in the Naval Hospital there from June 11 to June 18, 1956, when he was transferred to the Veterans Hospital at Augusta, where he remained until June 29, 1956.
It further appears from the foregoing affidavit that appellant now suffers, and has suffered for a number of years, from psychiatric disorders which affect his ability to drive an automobile and that some of the injuries for which compensation is now sought existed prior to the accident. Counsel states in this affidavit that the hospital records would have a very material bearing on appellant's claim for damages for loss of earnings and impaired earning capacity and on his further claim for damages for a nervous condition alleged to have been caused by the accident.
After the ex parte order of January 19, 1957, was issued, the Coast Guard made available to respondents the service and health records of appellant but the other governmental agencies refused to comply with said order and stated that they would do so only upon an order of court issued after notice to appellant and an opportunity for a hearing. Shortly thereafter counsel for respondents made demand upon appellant to produce for inspection all hospital records in his possession or under his control and that he give permission for inspection by respondents of the records in the various hospitals. Appellant refused this demand. Thereafter the order under review was obtained after due notice to appellant and a hearing.
The first contention on this appeal is that Judge Grimball erred in vacating the order made by him on January 19, 1957. Appellant says that the fact that this order was procured by respondents precludes them from seeking to vacate it. It is generally held that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to vacate or set aside their own judgments. Annotation 60 Am. St. Rep. 633. And the fact that the party who obtained such order is the one who is seeking to have it vacated does not necessarily preclude the Court from setting it aside. Annotation 40 A.L.R.2d 1127. In Dedrick v. Charrier, 15 N.D. 515, 108 N.W. 38, 39, the Court said:
In Foster v. Pruitt, 168 S.C. 262, 167 S.E. 410, 411, the Court, in holding that the Probate Court was empowered to modify or set aside an order previously made, said: "The court of common pleas and any court for that matter, may modify or set aside judgments made therein, if said action be taken in proper time."
We think under the foregoing authorities Judge Grimball was clearly empowered to vacate his order which had been issued without notice to appellant. No rights of third parties have intervened. Appellant argues that the vacation of the order of January 19, 1957 will prejudice him but this ordinarily is not a sufficient ground for refusing to vacate. See page 1136 of Annotation in 40 A.L.R.2d.
We next consider whether the Court erred in requiring appellant to submit to a pre-trial examination under Section 26-503 et seq., of the 1952 Code. Respondents asked for this examination for the purpose of ascertaining the names of the hospitals in which appellant had been confined and the doctors who have treated him and examining any records in his possession relating to his pre-existing physical condition. Respondents claim that this information is essential to their defense on the issue of damages and cannot be obtained otherwise.
Determination of whether "good and sufficient cause" for examination under this statute has been shown is addressed to the discretion of the Circuit Judge. Planters Fertilizer & Phosphate Co. v. McCreight, 187 S.C. 483, 198 S.E. 405; Williams v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 224 S.C. 415, 79 S.E.2d 365. We find no abuse of discretion. Mahaffey v. Southern Railway Co., 175 S.C. 198, 178 S.E. 838; Stepp v. Horton, 227 S.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 258. Of course, the examination of appellant will be strictly limited to the matters above mentioned.
In Mahaffey v. Southern Railway Co., supra, a plaintiff suing for injuries sustained when a train in which he was riding crashed into some unlighted freight cars was permitted to examine the agents of the railroad before the trial to determine who placed such cars upon the main line and to determine the rules of the railroad in force at the time of the collision, dealing with storage in the night time of box cars on the main line. In Stepp v. Horton, supra, we held that the Circuit Court was warranted in permitting the plaintiff to examine the claim agent of the railroad company to determine whether at ...